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STATEMENT OF FACTS

This lawsuit involves a dispute between neighbors who own adjacent lots in the Park
Wood Place Subdivision, located in Post Falls, Idaho. The development consists of upper scale
homes aligned along a single street, which ends in a cul-de-sac. The lots at the end of the
development have a single owner and include a large mansion and estate, called "River House."
A large stone plaque designates the entrance to the River House. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 821-822.
Immediately adjacent to the Wurmlingers' home on its south side is The River House's
caretaker's cottage, which is the residence of that estate's on-site manager. See Defendants'

Exhibit CC Greenfield's home is immediately adjacent to the Wurmlingers' on its north side.
Tr., Vol. II, p. 745, ll. 5-13. The original owner of Ms. Greenfield's home, Judy Richardson,

lived in that home from approximately 1993 until 2005. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 721-724.
The Wurmlingers purchased their lot in 1993 and built their home in 1994. Tr., Vol. L p.
217, ll. 13-21. The majority of homes in Park Wood Place were built between 1993 and 1998,

with several homes constructed more recently within the last six years. Tr., Vol. I pp. 418, ll. 1724. The Wurmlingers planted a row of arborvitae trees in 1994 or 1995 near the property line

between themselves and Ms. Richardson to provide privacy for both homes and for aesthetic
purposes. Tr., Vol. L p. 289, ll. 11-24; Tr., Vol. L p. 299, ll. 12-18.
The Wurmlingers have a home occupation at their residence - The River Cove Bed and
Breakfast - which they began shortly after moving in. They have operated the home occupation
at a consistent level since approximately 2005. Tr., Vol. L pp. 223-224; Tr., Vol. II, pp 737-738.
The Wurmlingers maintain a home occupation permit with the City of Post Falls for the Bed and
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Breakfast. Tr., Vol. I, p. 232, ll. 11-19; Tr., Vol. JI, pp. 786-787. The Bed and Breakfast is a
relatively small operation with only three guest rooms, generating no extra noise or traffic. From
the street, as well as neighboring homes, the home has the appearance of what it is - a large,
upscale residence. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 737-741.
Sometime after the death of her husband, Ms. Richardson decided to sell her home. Eric
Wurmlinger advised Ms. Greenfield that Ms. Richardson's home was on the market and
suggested that she might be interested. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 723-724; Tr., Vol. II, p. 734, ll. 16-22.
Greenfield negotiated directly with Ms. Richardson and visited the property twice before
purchasing. She was impressed with the view from the home and this was a primary reason for
her purchase. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 585-586.
At the time of purchase from Ms. Richardson, Greenfield was aware that the
Wurmlingers operated a Bed and Breakfast at their home. Tr., Vol. II, p. 725, ll. 19-23; Tr., Vol.
II, pp. 596-598. Ms. Richardson told Ms. Greenfield of the Bed and Breakfast on one of her

visits, pointing out the small brick monument and plaque in the Wurmlingers' front yard.
Additionally, Greenfield had previously delivered at least one guest to the Wurmlingers' Bed and
Breakfast in connection with her job as a limousine driver. Tr., Vol. II, p. 573, ll. 3-15.
At the time of purchase, Ms. Greenfield was also aware of the row of arborvitae near the
property line which "made a nice barrier between the properties" and were "fairly high,"
providing good privacy for both homes. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 724-725. In short, although a primary
reason for Greenfield's purchase was the view from the home, she had no concerns that the
arborvitae hedge was "blocking" that view. Tr., Vol. II., pp. 583-586, 589, 591-592.

RESPONDENTS' APPELLATE BRIEF

-8

Initially, Greenfield and the Wurmlingers were friendly with one another. Tr., Vol. IL p.
509, ll. 6-19. During the first couple months of her ownership, Ms. Greenfield discussed the Bed
and Breakfast operation with Eric Wurmlinger, suggesting that he could refer his guests to a spa
she was conducting or hoped to conduct in her new home. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 574-582. However, in
2005, Greenfield became upset when the Wurmlingers informed her that the Wurmlingers were
planning an addition for their house. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 510-511. Greenfield contacted the City,
opposing the planned addition. Tr., Vol. IL p. 513, ll. 6-13. The Wurmlingers decided not to
construct the planned addition to their home. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 738-739.
Greenfield began complaining about both the Bed and Breakfast and the arborvitae
hedge. In that regard, the City of Post Falls had an ordinance which limited fences to a height of
six feet. As originally written, the ordinance specifically included vegetative hedges within the
definition of fence. Defendants' Trial Exhibit "Y" (Judicial Notice Taken (see Amended Clerk's
Certificate of Exhibits, p. 7) - Post Falls Ordinance No. 1114 Amending Section 18. 24. 020 of
Post Falls Code).

Ms. Greenfield thus complained to the City, asking that they require

Wurmlinger to cut his arborvitae hedge back to six feet. Tr., Vol. IL p. 516, ll. 12-17; see also
Plaintiffs Exhibit #12. At approximately the same time in 2006, Greenfield hired an attorney,
Kacey Wall, to write letters to the Wurmlingers purporting to represent "association members"
who were allegedly unhappy with the Wurmlingers' Bed and Breakfast, as well as the height of
their hedge. Tr., Vol. IL p. 515, ll. 4-15. The first letter complained that the Wurmlingers' Bed
and Breakfast was prohibited by the CC&Rs and that the arborvitae were in violation of both the
CC&R's restricting fence height and the city ordinance restricting shrub height. Tr., Vol. IL p.
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516, ll. 18-25; Tr., Vol. I., pp. 322-323; Tr., Vol. I., pp. 349, ll. 20-23. The Wurmlingers

responded by letter stating that the arborvitae trees were not a "fence," and thus not subject to the
CC&R restricting fence height. See Plaintiff's Exhibit #16: Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 327-328.
Based on Greenfield's complaint, a representative of the City, Mr. Collin Coles, wrote the
Wurmlingers, advising them of the ordinance and its height restriction for hedges at six feet. The
Wurmlingers engaged in negotiations with the City about their arborvitae. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 818820. The Wurmlingers complied with their directives. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 818-820; see also
Plaintiff's Exhibits #12, #14. Wurmlingers trimmed the arborvitae to the height of six feet as the

ordinance required, and the City was satisfied.
As to Ms. Wall's letter, the Wurmlingers responded, stating that the arborvitae trees were
not a "fence," and thus not subject to the CC&R restricting fence height. See Plaintiff's Exhibit
#16; Tr., Vol. I., pp. 327-328. The Wurmlingers' response also explained that they had pruned

the arborvitae and that the City of Post Falls was satisfied by the pruning. See Plaintiff's Exhibit
#16. Kacey Wall then responded that even though the arborvitae still exceed five (5) feet in

height, her clients accepted the pruning and were hopeful that the Wurmlingers intended to
maintain the arborvitae at their current height. Tr., Vol. I. pp. 401-402.
Ms. Greenfield would later contend that the letter exchange created an agreement with
the Wurmlingers that they would maintain the arborvitae to a height of six (6) feet. However, the
Wurmlingers never agreed to maintain the arborvitae at any specific height. Tr., Vol. I. pp. 402403. There was no communication between Greenfield and the Wurmlingers after the letter

exchange. Tr., Vol. II, p. 751, ll. 10-17. Greenfield contended that, approximately a year before
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the cutting, she had written a letter to Wurrnlingers. However, the letter was not dated or signed,
and Wurmlingers denied ever receiving it. See Plaintiffs Exhibit #29; Tr., Vol. IL pp. 809-810.
Wurmlingers' concern regarding the application of the City Ordinance to hedges was
subsequently addressed by the City Council. After public hearing, the Ordinance was amended to
eliminate hedges from the six foot restriction. Tr. Vol. IL pp. 673-674; see also Defendants' Trial

Exhibit "Y" (Judicial Notice Taken (see Amended Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, p. 7) - Post
Falls Ordinance No. 1114 Amending Section 18.24.020 ofPost Falls Code).
In 2008, the focus of Greenfield's complaints shifted to wedding ceremonies conducted at
the Bed and Breakfast. Tr., Vol. IL p. 785, ll. 9-16. Greenfield complained that these weddings
were accompanied by loud music and increased traffic and street parking. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 533-

534, pp. 537-538; see also Tr., Vol. L pp. 278-279. Greenfield advised the City again and
requested that the City act to stop the ceremonies. At one point, Greenfield even confronted a
guest at the Bed and Breakfast, Troy Lang, intimating that weddings weren't allowed and that the
police were waiting to shut down the Bed and Breakfast. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 789-790.
The Wurmlingers received letters from the city about the weddings and responded
accordingly. Tr., Vol. IL p. 785, ll. 17-21. Ultimately, the Wurmlingers came to a resolution with
the City by clarifying the small scale of the wedding ceremonies conducted at the Bed and
Breakfast and agreeing to remove any wording from the Bed and Breakfast website suggesting
accommodations for larger groups of people. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 785-786.
In April, 2010, the Wurmlingers went on vacation. Tr., Vol. IL p. 751, ll. 6-9. When they
returned, they found that someone had literally cut their arborvitae hedge in half, to a five (5)
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foot height. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 751-752. The Wurmlingers reported this to the police. They advised
that they suspected Ms. Greenfield. Ms. Greenfield complains that they did not also advise the
police of her "agreement" with them to maintain the arborvitae hedge at six (6) feet. Tr., Vol. I.,
pp. 329-331.

Both parties made multiple complaints to the police about one another. E.g., Tr., Vol. I.,
pp. 350-358; Tr., Vol.

IL pp. 617-619; Tr., Vol. IL pp. 793-795. The Wurmlinger property was

vandalized numerous times. Tr., Vol. I., p. 362, ll. 3-19; Tr., Vol. IL p. 658, ll. 3-14. In an effort
to stop the vandalism and at the suggestion of the police, the Wurmlingers placed several
surveillance cameras to monitor their property. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 709-712. Ms. Greenfield came to
believe that the cameras were aimed at her and were invading her privacy.
These events eventually resulted in Greenfield filing this lawsuit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Greenfield asserted four causes of action against the Wurmlingers: (1) Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief; (2) Nuisance, Abatement and Damages; (3) Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.
As to the first cause of action, Greenfield requested the district court to declare that the
operation of the Bed and Breakfast violated the CC&Rs and to enjoin its operation at the
Wurmlingers' residence. Further, Greenfield requested that the Court declare defendants'
arborvitae hedge to be a "fence" and that it therefore violates the CC&Rs restriction on fences.
She also asked that defendant be enjoined from allowing the hedge to exceed that fence
restriction in the future. Finally, Plaintiff alleged that Wurmlingers had blocked and failed to
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maintain an easement established by the CC&Rs for the benefit of the development residents and
sought equitable relief in connection therewith.
As to the second cause of action, Greenfield asserted that the arborvitae planted on the
Wurmlingers' property obstructed her view of the Spokane River, thus constituting a nuisance
which, inter alia, reduced her property value. Greenfield sought monetary damages, as well as an
Order of Abatement.
As to the third cause of action, intentional infliction of emotional distress, Greenfield
claimed, inter alia, that Wurmlingers falsely accused her of damaging/destroying the arborvitae
hedge which resulted in her being criminally charged and prosecuted. Although she did not deny
that she had had the hedge "trimmed," she contended that her actions were justified. Pointing to
the letters by Ms. Wall, Greenfield contended that she had reached an agreement with defendants
that they would keep the hedge trimmed to a six foot height and that their failure to do so entitled
her to essentially reduce the height of the hedge by half. Further, she alleged that the failure of
Wurmlingers to advise the police of this alleged agreement when reporting their suspicions that
Greenfield had damaged the hedge, was outrageous conduct.
The fourth cause of action, negligent infliction of emotional distress, was based on the
same alleged conduct as the IIED claim, except the conduct was styled as a "breach of duty." The
trial court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress count on summary judgment,
(R .. , p. 175), but allowed plaintiff to proceed with a negligent infliction of emotional distress
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claim. 1 This included her effort to prove a "contract" with the Wurmlingers that they would
maintain the hedge.
The Wurmlingers asserted several counterclaims, only one of which, timber trespass, is at
issue in this appeal.
On November 26, 2012, a five-day jury trial commenced with the jury hearing the claims
based in law and the district court hearing the evidence as trier of fact on the claims based in
equity. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was instructed and propounded questions on
the Special Verdict Form. Greenfield did not object to any specific jury instruction, take
exception that any of hers were not given, nor object to the Special Verdict Form. Tr. Vol. JJL p.
967, ll. 8-13.

The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Wurmlingers on each of Greenfield's
claims, and also found in favor of the Wurmlingers on their counterclaims. The jury found that
neither the Wurmlingers' maintenance of their arborvitae nor the operation of their Bed and
Breakfast constituted a nuisance. Additionally, the jury found that the Wurmlingers had not
caused Greenfield emotional distress. As to the Wurmlingers' counterclaims, the jury found that
the arborvitae qualified as trees and that Greenfield had therefore committed timber trespass with
her extensive damaging. The jury awarded the Wurmlingers timber trespass damages in the
amount of $17,000.00, which the district court then trebled pursuant to LC.§ 6-202. Lastly, the
jury found that Greenfield had negligently inflicted emotional distress on the Wurmlingers, and

Ms. Greenfield has not appealed the dismissal of her IIED claim.
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awarded damages in the amount of $52,000.00 on that claim. Ms. Greenfield has not appealed
this finding by the jury or the award of damages.
Having heard the evidence during the trial, the Court requested written closing arguments
on the equitable claims. On March 25, 2013, after consideration, the district court issued a Post
Court Trial Memorandum Decision and Order, dismissing Greenfield's claims for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief. The district court found that the Bed and Breakfast qualified as a
home occupation as envisioned by the CC&Rs and was in compliance with the restrictions
provided in those covenants. The district court also found that the Wurmlingers' arborvitae hedge
was not a fence and therefore not in violation of the five foot CC&R height restriction for fences.
The Wurmlingers then filed a Motion to Allow Costs, including reasonable attorney fees
for work associated with the timber trespass and CC&R claims, which was granted by the district
court. The district court awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of $9,041.77 and
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $56,713.60.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The Wurmlingers have attempted to organize and consolidate plaintiffs issues on appeal.
The Wurmlingers intend to and believe they have included and addressed each of Greenfield's
denominated issues:
I.

Does substantial evidence support the district court's finding that the
Wurmlingers' operation of the Bed and Breakfast did not violate the CC&Rs?
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2.

Was the district court correct in finding the CC&R's restriction regarding the
height of fences does not apply to the arborvitae hedge, thus declining injunctive
relief?

3.

Was the jury's finding that the Bed and Breakfast does not constitute a nuisance
supported by substantial evidence?

4.

Was the jury's finding that the arborvitae do not constitute a nuisance supported
by substantial evidence?

5.

Was the jury's finding that the Wurmlingers did not negligently inflict emotional
distress on Greenfield supported by substantial evidence?

6.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that the Wurmlingers'
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim was tried by consent of the
parties pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(b)?

7.

Was the jury's timber trespass verdict supported by substantial evidence?

8.

Has appellant preserved any issue regarding the jury instructions or the special
verdict form when she failed to make objection or take exception to any during
trial?

9.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing admission of the Monaco
survey into evidence?

10.

Are Greenfield's constitutional issues properly before the Supreme Court?

11.

Did the district judge abuse his discretion by not recusing himself?

12.

Did the district judge commit a "fraud upon the court?"
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13.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding reasonable attorney fees to
the Wurmlingers for work associated with the timber trespass and CC&R claims?

14.

Are the Wurmlingers entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
ARGUMENT

As an initial principle:
Pro se litigants are not entitled to special consideration or leniency
because they represent themselves. To the contrary, it is well-established
that courts will apply the same standards and rules whether or not a party
is represented by an attorney and that pro se litigants must follow the same
rules, including the rules of procedure.

Bettweiser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 322, 297 P.3d 1134 (2013). Indeed, any
special consideration for pro se litigants would prejudice the opposing litigant for having the
assistance of legal counsel. Like in the Bettweiser appeal, Greenfield's briefing is difficult to
follow. In several instances, it is unclear what issue Greenfield is addressing. Even where the
legal issue raised is relatively identifiable, Greenfield fails to present pertinent or persuasive
argument, authority, and/or legal reasoning.
Greenfield cites to evidence which was not admitted. E.g., Respondents' Trial Exhibit

#Ton p. 21 of Appellant's Brief. Greenfield also makes numerous statements regarding evidence
at trial which are not supported by a citation to the record. E.g., Appellant's Brief, p. 26 ("Both
Arborists testified that the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs were neither damaged nor destroyed, but
are healthy and thriving, mostly due to pruning.").
Numerous times, Greenfield misrepresents evidence and testimony cited. For example,
Greenfield's citation near the top of p. 42 of Appellant's Brief is purportedly to a newspaper
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article exhibit wherein Eric Wurmlinger "persecute[s] the Appellant as a 'Hedge Hacker'
defaming her good name and distorting the truth to the media." However, the trial exhibit cited
by Greenfield (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit # 100) does not contain the phrase "Hedge Hacker." The
exhibit does contain statements attributed to Eric Wurmlinger, but these statements only address
the amount of arborvitae cut, the main purpose of the arborvitae - privacy - and the effect
Greenfield's cutting had on the Wurmlinger's privacy. See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit# 100.
Furthermore, Greenfield makes numerous uncited factual assertions which are untrue and
without foundation. One such example appears on p. 46 of Appellant's Brief where she states,
"Appellant objected to the format of the new direct verdict form, stating that it may confuse the
jury on the claims." The assertion is not supported by any citation to the record. Indeed, during
the jury instructions conference, Judge Haynes specifically asked Greenfield whether she
objected to any of the court's proposed jury instructions, the special verdict form or the failure to
give any of Greenfield's proposed instructions, and Greenfield did not object. Tr., Vol. Ill p.
967, ll. 8-13.

Finally, Greenfield cites to her own briefing, as if the factual assertions asserted there
were supported by evidence submitted to the jury and the district court. See Appellant's Brief,
pp.42-43 (citing R., pp. 128-149). Briefing is not evidence received by the trier of fact. The
Court should disregard such citations.
The Idaho Supreme Court will not consider issues not supported by argument and
authority in the opening brief:
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Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with
particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. A general
attack on the findings and conclusions of the district court, without
specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve
an issue. This Court will not search the record on appeal for error.
Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and
supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived.

Bettweiser, 154 Idaho at 323 (quoting Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146
(2010)) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, the Court will not consider issues "lacking in
coherence, citations to the record, citations of applicable authority, or comprehensible
argument." Id.
Greenfield's briefing suffers many of the same defects noted in the Bach and Bettweiser
decisions. While Greenfield makes citations to legal authority, the relevance and applicability are
not clear nor explained, and cogent argument is sparse. See id. Greenfield fails to distinguish
between jury and district court determinations, fails to address the standard of review, seeks to
supplement her trial presentation with exhibits and materials not introduced at trial, and
essentially attempts to re-argue her entire case on the merits.
A.

The District Court's Equitable Findings Regarding Alleged CC&R Violations:
Issues 1 and 2.
Greenfield challenges numerous equitable determinations by the district court. The

standard of review for a district judge's equitable decisions in a bench trial is abuse of discretion,
and underlying findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence:
Imposition of an equitable remedy requires a balancing of the equities,
which is inherently a factual determination; therefore, the district court's
imposition of such a remedy should be reviewed for an abuse of
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discretion. A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly
perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of
discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the
decision through an exercise of reason.
Review of a trial court's conclusions from a bench trial is limited to
ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and
whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Since it is the
province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and
to judge the credibility of the witnesses, this Court will liberally construe
the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered. This
Court will not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings
are clearly erroneous. If the trial court based its findings on substantial
evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not overturn
those findings on appeal. This Court will not substitute its view of the
facts for that of the trial court. However, this Court exercises free review
over matters oflaw.

Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509,511,211 P.3d 118 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
1.

The District Court's Finding that the Bed and Breakfast Did Not Violate the
CC&Rs Is Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Greenfield argues that the district judge erred in determining that the Wurmlingers' Bed
and Breakfast is in compliance with Park Wood Place CC&Rs and in failing to enter injunctive
relief
As noted in Judge Haynes' Post Court Trial Memorandum Decision and Order, the
applicable CC&R pertaining to the Bed and Breakfast was Article I, Section l(a):
No grantee under any conveyance, owner, tenant, or other person shall at
any time conduct, or permit to be conducted on any lot, any trade or
business of any kind, either commercial or religious, including, but not
limited to, day care, school, nursery, out-patient, treatment, rehabilitation
or recovery facilities, nor shall said premises be used for any other
purpose whatsoever except for the purpose of a private dwelling or
residence for one family. Home occupations of family members, which
have no exterior visibility, are not prohibited provided they are conducted
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totally within the residence, are not open to the public, have no employees
and do not generate extra vehicular traffic or street parking.
R., p. 428; Plaintiffs Trial Ex. #1 (emphasis added).

The district court found that the Wurmlingers' operation of the bed and breakfast does not
violate the unambiguous2 CC&Rs because it is a home occupation that complies with the
restrictions provided in Article I, Section l(a) of the CC&Rs.
The court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. First, it was
undisputed that the Wurmlingers occupy a single family residence (Tr., p. 805, l. 22) and that the
Bed and Breakfast has no employees (Tr., p. 244, l. 10; p. 263, ll. 10-17). No evidence was
presented to the contrary.
Second, the district court found that the bed and breakfast has no exterior visibility.
Evidence at trial, including photographs, demonstrated that the bed and breakfast has no exterior
visibility and has the appearance of a nice home rather than an operating business. See
Defendants' Exhibit KK; see also Plaintiffs Exhibit 102. Cathy Camyn, who lived in the

Caretaker's house immediately South of the Wurmlinger's residence from 2000-2010, testified
that the Wurmlingers' residence looked like a home. Tr., p. 862, ll. 9-12. Another neighbor and
city council member, Joe Malloy, who lives across the street from Greenfield, testified that the
Wurmlingers' residence looks like a nice house and he only realized the Wurmlingers were
running a Bed and Breakfast when Eric Wurmlinger told him. Tr., p. 884, ll. 2-18.

2

Greenfield does not challenge the court's conclusion of law that the CC&Rs as a whole, and
individually, are clear and unambiguous.
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Third, the district court found that the Bed and Breakfast operates within the residence.
R., p. 431. While guests do occasionally venture outside of the residence, such conduct as using

the hot tub or the patio is not inconsistent with operating the Bed and Breakfast within the
residence, nor is it inconsistent with the usual and expected activities of a residence. Tr., Vol. I,
pp. 231-232. Eric and Rosalyn Wurm.linger testified that all Bed and Breakfast operations are

conducted within the residence, and Eric Wurm.linger further testified that guests are attracted to
the Bed and Breakfast because it is secluded and quiet. Tr. Vol. I, p. 219, ll. 11-24; Tr. Vol. L p.
224, ll. 17-18; Tr. Vol. L p. 265, ll. 7-11; Tr., Vol. IL pp. 739-740. Albert Hutson, a minister,

testified that he previously conducted wedding ceremonies at the Bed and Breakfast, that any
music was very quiet, and that the weddings were like private weddings in private homes. Tr.,
Vol. II, pp. 867-873. Rocky Pool, who lived next door to Greenfield opposite the Wurm.lingers

from 1993-2005, only knew that weddings were conducted because Eric Wurm.linger told him.
Tr., Vol. IL pp. 877-880. Ashley Labau, another neighbor who rented the house next door to

Greenfield opposite the Wurm.lingers in 2009-2010, testified that she didn't hear any noise from
the Wurm.lingers' property. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 847-848. Finally, the court relied heavily on Judy
Richardson's testimony, the previous owner of Greenfield's residence between 1993 and 2005.
R., p. 432. She testified that she slept in the same bedroom that Greenfield currently sleeps in and

never heard any excessive noise or believed that wedding ceremonies caused any problems. Tr.,
Vol. IL pp. 717-722.

The Bed and Breakfast is a home occupation which is entirely consistent with the daily
comings, goings, and activities of a residence. That the exact number of residents fluctuates does
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not change the nature of the residence. As such, the district court found that while guests do
occasionally venture outside of the residence, such conduct as using the hot tub or the patio is not
inconsistent with operating the Bed and Breakfast within the residence, nor is it inconsistent with
the normal and expected activities of a residence. R., p. 432.
Fourth, the district court found that the Bed and Breakfast does not generate extra traffic
or street parking. R., p. 432. The Court relied upon the testimony of former neighbors
Richardson, Labau, Camyn, and Pool, as well as current neighbor Joe Malloy, who each testified
that they did not observe increased traffic. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 721-722; Tr., Vol. IL p. 848, ll. 18-20;
Tr., Vol. IL p. 860, ll. 20-24; Tr., Vol. II, p. 878, ll. 23-25; Tr., Vol. IL p. 884, ll. 19-24. Eric

Wurmlinger also testified that guests rarely park on the street and most guests park in his
driveway. Tr., Vol. I, p. 271, ll. 1-13. While Greenfield contends that Plaintiffs Exhibit #102
proves that the Wurmlingers' Bed and Breakfast caused increased traffic and parking because of
its weddings, Eric Wurmlinger testified that the pictures in Plaintiffs Exhibit #102 of traffic and
street parking depicts a one-time professional meeting event, and not an illustration of a typical
wedding at the Bed and Breakfast. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 705-707. Eric Wurmlinger and Joe Malloy
both further testified that get-togethers and parking on the street are common in the
neighborhood. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 708-709; Tr. Vol. II, pp. 885-887.
Fifth, the district court found that the Bed and Breakfast is not open to the public. R., p.
433. Analogizing to common businesses, the court determined that open to the public means that
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the public would be welcome to walk in off the street unannounced and uninvited. 3 R., p. 433.
Eric Wurmlinger testified that the Bed and Breakfast is not open to the public, does not accept
walk-up clientele, does not advertise with street signs, and doesn't invite the public to walk in
without a reservation. Tr., Vol. L pp. 282-284; Tr., Vol. L pp. 229-230; Tr., Vol. IL pp. 741-743.
Instead, the Wurmlingers described the procedure as: guests call and inquire about availability,
the Wurmlingers ask questions about the guests, and then the Wurmlingers decide whether to
invite the guests to stay. Tr., Vol. L pp. 229-230.
Finally, Greenfield appears to contend that the Bed and Breakfast is a "business," not a
home occupation. Notwithstanding that the terms are not mutually exclusive, evidence was
presented that the Bed and Breakfast is indeed a permitted home occupation. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 227232. The court's finding that the operation of the Bed and Breakfast does not violate the CC&Rs

was supported by substantial evidence, and its finding should not be overturned. Accordingly, no
equitable remedy was appropriate.
2.

The District Court's Finding that the Arborvitae Trees Are Not Subject to
the CC&R Section Restricting the Height of Fences Is Supported by
Substantial Evidence.

Greenfield contends that the district judge erred in determining that the Wurmlingers'
arborvitae trees do not violate the Park Wood Place CC&Rs and in failing to enter injunctive
relief. The applicable CC&R pertaining to the arborvitae hedge is Article II, Section 2:
Building Conditions: No building shall be erected except one detached
single-family dwelling on each lot which does not exceed two and one half
3

Greenfield does not appear to challenge the district court's interpretation of the unambiguous
CC&Rs term "open to the public."
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stories in height, together with a private attached garage for not less than
two cars. No dwelling, building or other structure shall be moved on to
any lot; new construction being required. No tent, trailer, mobile home,
boat or other vehicle or structure shall be used or allowed for human
habitation on a temporary or permanent basis on any lot at any time. No
lot, lots or parcels, shall ever be enclosed or fenced by any fence or
structure exceeding five (5) feet in height. Approval from the Architectural
Control Committee shall be required for all fences.
R., p. 434; Plaintiffs Trial Ex. #1 (emphasis added).

Reiterating its conclusion that the CC&Rs are clear and unambiguous, the court found
that the above section does not apply to the arborvitae because the hedge is not a fence. R., p.
436.

Article II, Section 2 provides restrictions relating to the construction and building of
permanent man-made structures, like residences. R., p. 436,· see also Plaintiffs Trial Ex. #1.
Meanwhile, the only CC&R section which speaks to landscaping and trees is Article II,
Section 1, providing that no new buildings may be erected until the construction, landscaping,
and tree plans are approved by the Architectural Control Committee. See Plaintiffs Trial Ex. #1.
Eric Wurmlinger testified that the Architectural Control Committee approved of the
Wurmlingers landscaping plans. Tr., Vol. L pp. 417-419.
Article II, Section 8 of the CC&Rs contemplates that the owners of lots 1 and 17 shall
maintain the "fences" on their lots. Plaintiffs Trial Ex. #1. Lots 1 and 17 are opposing lots at the
entrance to the development. Each lot has a fence along its boundary, which culminate in
forming the entrance to the development. Eric Wurmlinger testified that both of these fences are
ordinary and typical stone column and wood board fences marking the entrance to the

RESPONDENTS' APPELLATE BRIEF

-25

subdivision

strong evidence that the term "fence" within the CC&Rs means a man-constructed

structure, not a border formed by vegetation or landscaping. Tr., Vol. L pp. 419-420.
Additionally, Joe Malloy testified that prior to Greenfield's Complaint, nobody else in the
neighborhood had ever contended that arborvitae are fences subject to the five foot CC&R fence
height restriction. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 883-884. Rocky Pool testified that his arborvitae hedge grew to
approximately eight feet in height. Tr., Vol. II, p. 879, ll. 6-15. Cathy Camyn also testified that
the River House has arborvitae rows in excess of six (6) feet in height. Tr., Vol. IL p. 864, ll. 112.
Therefore, the district court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, and
the court's factual findings support its conclusion that the Wurmlingers' arborvitae are not a fence
under Article II, Section 2. In light of this finding, no equitable relief was appropriate.
B.

Jury Findings On The Non-Equitable Claims
Again, appellant has not distinguished between findings made by the district court, and

those made by the jury. Nevertheless, all of the non-equitable issues were determined by the jury.
Greenfield challenges numerous findings regarding the arborvitae trees and the Bed and
Breakfast which were made by the jury. Jury findings are subject to a substantial evidence
standard of review: "This Court will not overturn a jury verdict if it is supported by substantial
and competent evidence ... A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to
that of the jury." Vanderford v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 552, 165 P.3d 261 (2007) (internal
citations omitted).
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1.

Plaintiff Greenfield's Claims: Issues 3, 4 and 5.
a.

The Jury's Finding that the Bed and Breakfast Is Not a Nuisance Is
Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Greenfield does not appear to specifically appeal the jury's finding that the Bed and
Breakfast does not constitute a nuisance. However, given that this issue was central in the trial
below and of great importance to the Wurmlingers, it is briefly addressed here. Idaho law
recognizes that lawful, reasonable use of property is not a nuisance, even if it affects neighboring
property. Where "Respondents' business was lawful in itself and was conducted in a community
where it had a legal right to be, ... , whether such property constituted a nuisance presents the
question whether the use to which the property was put was reasonable or unreasonable."
McNichols v. JR. Simplot Co., 74 Idaho 321, 323, 262 P.2d 1012 (1953) (citing Payne v.
Johnson, 20 Wn.2d 24, 145 P.2d 552 (1944); Canfield v. Quayle, 170 Misc. 621, 10 N.Y.S.2d
781 (1939); Hansen v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959 (1939)).
The jury received testimony regarding the Bed and Breakfast's operations and determined
that it was not a nuisance. R., p. 260. Evidence was presented that the Bed and Breakfast is
indeed a lawful permitted home occupation. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 227-232. Judy Richardson, who
previously lived in Greenfield's house, testified that the Bed and Breakfast did not cause any
disturbances to her. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 720-722. Judy Richardson further testified that she slept in
the same bedroom that Greenfield currently sleeps in and never heard any excessive noise. Nor
did she believe that the occasional wedding ceremony caused any problems. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 717-
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722. The Bed and Breakfast operation was substantially similar when Ms. Richardson lived in

the home as when Greenfield has lived in the home.
Eric Wurmlinger testified that guests are attracted to the Bed and Breakfast because it is
secluded and quiet. Tr. Vol. L p. 219, ll. 11-24; Tr. Vol. L p. 224, ll. 17-18; Tr. Vol. I, p. 265, ll.
7-11; Tr., Vol. IL pp. 739-740. Albert Hutson, a minister, testified that he previously conducted

wedding ceremonies at the Bed and Breakfast, that any music was very quiet, and that the
weddings were like private weddings in private homes. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 867-873. Ashley Labau
testified that she didn't hear any noise from the Wurmlingers' property. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 847-848.
The Bed and Breakfast does not generate extra traffic or street parking. Former neighbors
Richardson, Labau, Camyn, and Pool, as well as current neighbor Joe Malloy, each testified that
they did not observe increased traffic. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 721-722; Tr., Vol. IL p. 848, ll. 18-20; Tr.,
Vol. IL p. 860, ll. 20-24; Tr., Vol. IL p. 878, ll. 23-25; Tr., Vol. IL p. 884, ll. 19-24.

Therefore, the jury's finding that the Bed and Breakfast does not constitute a nuisance is
supported by substantial evidence.
b.

The Jury's Finding that the Arborvitae Hedge Is Not a Nuisance Is
Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Greenfield contends that the jury erred by finding that the arborvitae are not a nuisance.
The Wurmlingers' use of their property to maintain the arborvitae shrubs for privacy is lawful
and was approved by the city. Tr., Vol. L pp. 327-328. Therefore, in order to constitute a
nuisance, the Wurmlingers' use of the property to maintain the arborvitae shrubs for privacy must
be unreasonable. In other words, the Wurmlingers' lawful use of their property to maintain the
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arborvitae shrubs for privacy is not a nuisance if it is a reasonable use of their property.
Maintaining shrubs near the property boundary for privacy does not unreasonably interfere with
Greenfield's use and enjoyment of her own property.
"Generally, a landowner does not have a right of access to air, light, and view over
adjoining property, and the law is reluctant to imply such a right." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Adjoining

Landowners, § 93 (2005) (citing Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 308 (4 th Dist. 2004), as modified, (July 13, 2004); Stewart v. Secor Realty & Inv. Corp.,
667 So. 2d 52 (Ala. 1995) (A property owner is not entitled to a view); Pacifica Homeowners'

Assn. v. Wesley Palms Retirement Community, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 224 Cal. Rptr. 380 (4 th
Dist. 1986)). "The general common-law rule is that one cannot complain of trees or shrubbery on
adjoining land regardless of their thickness or height, since the adjoining landowner is within his
or her rights in making such use of his or her land." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Adjoining Landowners, § 32
(2005) (citing Granberry v. Jones, 188 Tenn. 51, 216 S.W.2d 721 (1949)). As a general rule,
there is no nuisance simply because a neighboring landowner has used his or her property in a
way that obstructs the view of an adjacent landowner. Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 55 Wn.
App. 481,485, 778 P.2d 534 (1989) (citing Scharlack v. Gulf Oil Corp., 368 S.W.2d 705, 707
(Tex. 1963); Wolf v. Forcum, 130 Ind.App. 10, 161 N.E.2d 175 (1959); Venuto v. Owens-

Corning Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 22 Cal.App.3d 116 (1971); Mohr v. Midas Realty
Corp., 431 N.W.2d 380 (Iowa 1988)); see also 8,960 SQ. Feet v. Dept. ofTransp., 806 P.2d 843
(Alaska 1991) (citing La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummings, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986); 2A J.
Sackman & P. Rohan, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain,§ 6.32 at 6-226 (rev. 3d ed. 1989);
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44 Plaza, Inc. v. Gray-Pac Land Co., 845 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1992); Kruger v. Shramek, 5 Neb.

App. 802, 565 N.W.2d 742 (1997)).
Applying these general principles to Idaho nuisance law, the Wurmlingers' use of their
property to maintain arborvitae shrubs for privacy is reasonable. Where an owner's use of
property is lawful and reasonable, that use is not a nuisance.
Greenfield suggests that the shrubs are a nuisance under the spite fence doctrine, citing
Sundowner v. King, 95 Idaho 367, 509 P.2d 785 (1973). However, Greenfield never pled a spite

fence cause of action and that doctrine is only applicable where a property owner erects a useless
structure for the sole purpose of injuring his neighbor. See Id.
The jury received evidence about Greenfield's view and how the arborvitae growth
affects Greenfield's view. Tr., Vol. IL p. 552, ll. 5-24; Tr. Vol. IL pp. 718-719; Tr., Vol. II, p.
844, ll. 11-14; Tr., Vol. II, pp. 626-627; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 25-1; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit
102-E. Judy Richardson, previous owner of Greenfield's home, testified that Greenfield knew

about the arborvitae when she purchased the home and that they were fairly high but Greenfield
made no complaint about them. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 724-725.

Richardson also testified that the

arborvitae provide good privacy for both homes. Tr., Vol. II, p. 725, ll. 2-14. Greenfield
acknowledged that at the time she bought the home, the arborvitae were at approximately the
height of the eaves of the Wurmlinger residence - probably eight or nine feet high. Tr., Vol. II,
pp. 591-592. The Wurmlingers testified that they planted and maintain the arborvitae for privacy

and aesthetic purposes. Tr., Vol. II, P. 769, ll. 5-8. Therefore, the jury's finding that neither the
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arborvitae trees nor the Bed and Breakfast constituted a nuisance was supported by substantial
and competent evidence.
The jury found that the arborvitae are not a nuisance, and that finding is supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, no injunctive relief was appropriate and Greenfield's
challenge in that regard also fails.
c.

The Jury's Finding that the Wurmlingers Did Not Negligently Inflict
Emotional Distress on Greenfield is Supported by Substantial
Evidence.

Greenfield attempts to reargue the merits of her negligent infliction of emotional (NIED)
claim on appeal. She makes passing reference to the dismissal of her intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim on summary judgment (R., p. 175), but she does not appeal that
dismissal. Greenfield's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim alleged extreme,
outrageous conduct by Wurmlingers, including, inter alia, falsely accusing her of
damaging/destroying the arborvitae hedge which resulted in her being criminally charged and
prosecuted. Greenfield contended that she had reached an agreement with defendants that they
would keep the hedge trimmed to a six foot height and that their failure to do so entitled her to
essentially cut the height of the hedge in half. Greenfield's NIED claim was based on the same
alleged conduct by the Wurmlingers, except such conduct was styled as a "breach of duty." The
Court allowed plaintiff to proceed with a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim which
included her effort to prove a "contract" with the Wurmlingers that they would maintain the
hedge.
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On appeal, she appears to claim that the jury should have awarded damages to her for
NIED caused by trespassing, installing surveillance cameras, and allegedly making false
statements to the police.
In order to prove NIED, a claimant must show (1) a legal duty, (2) breach, (3) causing,
(4) actual loss or damage, and (5) a physical manifestation of the claimant's emotional injury.
E.g., Frogley v. Meridian Joint School, 155 Idaho 558,569,314 P.3d 613 (2013).

Evidence also showed that the Wurmlingers did not have any agreement with Greenfield
to maintain the arborvitae at any specific height. Tr., Vol. L pp. 322-326; see also Plaintiffs
Exhibit 16. The Wurmlingers also testified that they only provided accurate information to the

police. E.g., Tr., Vol.

L p. 368, ll. 2-18; Tr., Vol. I, pp. 384, ll. 21-24; Tr., Vol. IL p. 744, ll. 20-

22. In contrast to her Complaint, Greenfield testified that the only untruthful representations

Wurmlingers made to the police were that the arborvitae were located on their property, and that
the pictures of the arborvitae they provided the police were not accurate. Tr. Vol. IL pp. 616-617.
Moreover, the jury received evidence that the Wurmlingers did not trespass, that the
surveillance cameras were intended and aimed only to monitor the Wurmlinger property, and
that the Wurmlingers did not make false reports to the police. Tr., Vol. IL p. 781, ll. 1-3; Tr., Vol.
IL pp. 709-712; Tr., Vol.

IL p. 744, ll. 20-22. The jury specifically found that the Wurmlingers

had not negligently inflicted emotional distress on Greenfield (R., p. 261), and that finding was
supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, Greenfield makes numerous citations to her Amended Trial Brief (R., pp. 122165) in an attempt to establish that she actually suffered emotional distress and physical
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manifestations thereof. However, Greenfield's Amended Trial Brief is not evidence heard by the
trier of fact. Greenfield has failed to cite a single piece of evidence demonstrating that she
suffered emotional distress or any physical manifestation thereof.
2.

Defendants Wurmlingers' Counterclaims: Issue 7
a.

The Jury's Timber Trespass Verdict Is Supported by Substantial
Evidence.

Greenfield challenges several aspects related to the jury's finding of timber trespass. First,
Greenfield argues that the jury could not have found that she committed timber trespass because
the arborvitae are shrubs as opposed to trees. Timothy Kastning, certified master arborist,
testified that the industry considers trees to be plants that can grow to more than fifteen (15) feet
in height. See Defendants' Trial Exhibit UU (Depa. Tr., p. 44, ll. 3-9). Kastning continued that
arborvitae can grow to heights of forty (40) feet and that he's worked on arborvitae twenty (20)
to twenty five (25) feet in height. Id. (Depa. Tr., p. 44, ll. 11-20). The jury received evidence
that, at times, the Wurmlingers' arborvitae were at least fifteen (15) feet in height. Defendants'
Trial Exhibits H, 1-2. Even Greenfield's expert witness, certified arborist Joseph Zubaly, testified

that the Wurmlingers' arborvitae could grow to approximately twenty (20) feet in height. Tr.,
Vol. L pp. 431-43 2. Rod Gunderson, the police detective assigned to investigate the cutting,

testified from a lay person's perspective that the arborvitae are more like trees than shrubs. Tr.,
Vol. IL p. 650, ll. 3-10.
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The jury unanimously answered the special verdict form question 14 that, based on the
evidence presented, the arborvitae are trees. R., 263. The jury's finding was supported by
substantial evidence and should not be overturned.
Second, Greenfield argues that the jury could not have awarded damages for timber
trespass because the arborvitae were not located on the Wurrnlingers' property. The jury received
evidence that the arborvitae trees were planted and located on the Wurrnlingers' side of the
property line. Tr., Vol. L p. 289, ll. 11-24; Tr., Vol. IL p. 785, ll. 7-8; Tr., Vol. II, p. 743-744;
Defendants' Trial Exhibit B. Therefore, the jury's finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Third, although unclear, Greenfield may be attempting to challenge whether there was
substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Greenfield acted intentionally or willfully
in committing timber trespass.
The evidence was uncontroverted that Greenfield's agent, Monroe Greenfield,
intentionally cut the arborvitae on the Wurrnlingers' property. Tr. Vol. L pp. 483-486; Tr., Vol. IL
pp. 887-888. While I.C. § 6-202 is not intended to apply to trespasses committed through an
innocent mistake as to the property boundary, a trespasser acts willfully and intentionally where
the trespasser has notice that the property is in dispute. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 863-864,
230 P.3d 743 (2010). That Greenfield chose to cut the arborvitae while the Wurrnlingers were on
vacation tends to show either (1) Greenfield knew that the arborvitae were on the Wurrnlinger
property, or (2) that she knew the property was in dispute because the Wurrnlingers at least
believed the arborvitae were on the Wurrnlinger property. Tr., Vol. IL p. 752, ll. 6-18; Tr., Vol.

IL pp. 887-888. Indeed, there was also evidence that Greenfield had previously acknowledged
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that the arborvitae were on the Wurmlingers' property. Tr., Vol. IL p. 785, ll. 1-8; Tr., Vol. IL p.
835, ll. 2-8.

Fourth, Greenfield appears to argue that the timber trespass verdict is not supported by
substantial evidence that the trees were damaged. However, Tim Kastning testified that the
arborvitae trees main stock would never re-grow and concluded that restoration was the
appropriate remediation to be done under the circumstances. See Defendants' Trial Exhibit UV
(Depa. Tr., pp. 31-33; p. 37, ll. 16-19).

Timber trespass damages may be based upon aesthetic value and other specific and
personal reasons. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 863-867, 230 P.3d 743 (2010). The
Wurmlingers testified that they value the arborvitae for specific and personal reasons, including
privacy and aesthetics, and that the cutting affected those purposes, thereby justifying
replacement value as an appropriate measure of damages. Tr., Vol. IL p. 769, ll. 5-8; Tr., Vol. IL
p. 771, ll. 2-12. For example, the cutting allowed a direct view from Greenfield's deck into one

of the Bed and Breakfast bedroom windows. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 770-771. Kastning also testified that
the actual replacement value of the arborvitae would be approximately $17,000.00. See
Defendants' Trial Exhibit VU (Depa. Tr., p. 39, ll. 17-23). Evidence was presented as to the

height of the arborvitae when they were cut and how much was cut. Tr., Vol. IL pp. 756-763; Tr.,
Vol. 11, p.652, ll. 14-23; Defendants' Trial Exhibits H, 1-2. Greenfield did not object to the jury

instructions or the special verdict form. Tr. Vol. III, p. 967, ll. 8-13. Therefore, the jury's timber
trespass damage award is supported by substantial evidence.
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Although difficult to follow, Greenfield appears to argue, for the first time, that she was
allowed to cut the arborvitae in abating a nuisance, pursuant to LC. § 52-302. However, as
argued supra, the jury concluded that the arborvitae hedge was not a nuisance, and that
conclusion was based on substantial evidence. R., p. 260. Accordingly, no right to abate was
developed at trial.
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Finding that the Wurmlingers'
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Was Tried by Consent of the
Parties Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(b): Issue 6.

Greenfield does not appeal the jury's finding that her conduct inflicted emotional distress
on the Wurmlingers. Rather, she contends that the claim was not "properly disclosed" and that it
has been previously dismissed. These assertions were not made until after the verdict and the
judge's decision had been returned. Accordingly, the issue before the Court is whether the NIED
claim was tried with the consent of the parties, and whether Ms. Greenfield has preserved that
issue when she failed during trial to object to the evidence, the jury instructions, or the special
verdict form. 4
The determination whether an issue has been tried with the consent of the parties
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(b) is within the trial court's discretion, and such determination will only
be reversed when that discretion has been abused. Belstler v. Sheler, 151 Idaho 819, 825, 264
P.3d 926 (2011).

4

Greenfield first raised her argument that the Wurmlingers had previously dismissed their
emotional distress claims rather cryptically in her "Rebuttal to Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict" (Reply Brief) R., p. 341; see also Tr., Vol. III, p. 1013-1014.

RESPONDENTS' APPELLATE BRIEF

-36

During the pre-trial conference, the court clarified the issues for trial. Tr., Vol. L p. 132,
ll. 12-25. The district court stated, "looks like we have some consensus on what is the existence

of the defendants' claims," and gave Greenfield another opportunity to object to, clarify, or
remark about the Wurmlingers' claims, but Greenfield made no objection, question, or comment
regarding the court's allowing evidence of NIED. Id. at pp. 143-144. The Wurmlingers presented
evidence during their case-in-chief as to how Greenfield's conduct had caused them emotional
distress. The Wurmlingers proposed jury instructions for both NIED and intentional infliction of
emotional distress which included Wurmlingers NIED claim. Tr. Vol. L pp. 142-143. The district
court presented a Special Verdict Form, which included questions regarding Wurmlingers' claim
of NIED. Greenfield did not object or make any record to either the instructions as give, or to the
Special Verdict Form. Id. After trial, Greenfield revealed that she indeed understood "that if the
jury found that there was any type of infliction of emotional distress on the defendants after
hearing the proceedings at the trial then maybe they could grant it." Tr. Vol. IIL p. 1017, ll. 1317.

To the extent Greenfield also appeals giving the NIED jury instruction, I.R.C.P. 51 (b)
states in relevant part: "No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an
instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the instruction to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection."
Additionally, "The correctness of jury instructions 'is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review, and the standard of review of whether a jury instruction should or should
not have been given, is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction."' Craig
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Johnson Constr., L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648

(2006). Greenfield did not object to any jury instructions, thereby waiving any assignment of
error that the court improperly gave the NIED jury instruction. Tr. Vol. IIL p. 967, ll. 8-13.
In addition, both Eric Wurmlinger and Rosalynn Wurmlinger testified that the emotional
distress caused by Greenfield's negligent harassing conduct resulted in physical manifestations.
Tr., Vol. IL pp. 795-796; Tr., Vol. JfL pp. 935-936. Such testimony was not relevant to any issue

other than the Wurmlingers' NIED claims, yet, again, Greenfield never objected. After hearing
the testimony, the jury found that Greenfield had inflicted emotional distress, and that finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
The record clearly shows that Greenfield knew in advance of trial and all along that the
Wurmlingers were claiming NIED, that the Wurmlingers would and did present evidence of
NIED, and that the jury would decide whether Greenfield was liable for NIED. However,
Greenfield never objected to the claim during the pretrial conference, never objected to the NIED
testimony by Wurmlingers, never objected to the NIED jury instructions nor to the special
verdict form which requested the jury's determination of the issue.
"The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow cases to be decided on the merits rather than upon
technical pleading requirements." Belstler, 151 Idaho at 825. Where a party fails to object to
evidence on an unpleaded issue while understanding the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded
issue, there is implied consent to try that unpleaded issue. Id.
While noting that it was not a proper issue for Greenfield's I.R.C.P. 50(b) motion, Judge
Haynes' Order Re: Plaintiffs Motions for JNOV and Set Aside Judgment demonstrates that
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Judge Haynes understood the issue as one within its discretion, acted within the bounds of that
discretion, and reached the decision by an exercise of reason. R., pp. 413-414. The District Court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Wurmlingers' NIED claim had been tried with the
consent of the parties and did not err by submitting it to the jury.

D.

Greenfield Never Objected to Any Jury Instructions or the Special Verdict Form,
She Has Thus Failed to Preserve Those Issues for Appeal: Issue 8.
Greenfield contends that the jury instructions and the special verdict form were

improperly amended and submitted. Greenfield does not explicitly appeal the decision to give
any specific jury instruction or any portion of the special verdict form. She appears instead to
object generally that the jury instructions and special verdict form were untimely. It is not clear
what she means by this.
As previously noted, "No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an
instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the instruction to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection." I.R.C.P.
51 (b).

Greenfield was presented with an opportunity to object to any jury instructions to be
given, and Greenfield did not object, thereby waiving any assignment of error. Tr. Vol. III, p.
967, ll. 8-13. Greenfield does not cite any objection to the jury instructions or the special verdict

form. Thus, Greenfield failed to preserve these issues for appeal, and they need not be addressed.
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E.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Admitting the Monaco Survey:
Issue 9.

Greenfield contends that the Wurmlingers' survey should not have been admitted as it
was not properly signed pursuant to LC.§ 54-1215.
Trial courts have 'broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial,
and [their] decision to admit such evidence will be reversed only when
there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.' .. . In the case of an
incorrect ruling regarding evidence, a new trial is merited only if the error
affects a substantial right of one of the parties.
Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,564, 97 P.3d 428 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
Idaho Code § 54-1215 is not an evidentiary rule of admissibility. Jon Monaco testified as
to the methods used to conduct the survey and how the measurements, recordings, and findings
were accurately transferred to and portrayed on the survey. Defendants' Trial Exhibit TT (Depo.
Tr., pp.13-17). As such, the survey was sufficiently authenticated, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing admission of the survey.
Even if the district court did err, any error was harmless as it was mitigated by Monaco's
deposition testimony and other testimony regarding the location of the arborvitae. White v. Mock,
140 Idaho 882, 891, 104 P.3d 356 (2004); for such evidence, see: Defendant's Trial Exhibit TT
(Depo. Tr., pp.13-19); Tr., Vol. L p. 289, ll. 11-24; Tr., Vol. II, p. 785, ll. 7-8; Tr., Vol. IL p. 743744.
F.

Greenfield's Allegations of Constitutional Rights Violations Are Misplaced:
Issue 10.

Greenfield seeks to assert a violation of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, contending that the district court deprived her of a federal right under color of law.
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Although Greenfield may believe she has such a claim, her remedy is not during the appeal of
her state court action against the Wurmlingers. Such a claim was never pled against Wurmlingers
and, had it been, would not have stated a claim. As private citizens, the Wurmlingers' conduct
isn't attributable to the state and cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim. "The under-color-ofstate-law element of a § 1983 claim excludes from its reach merely private conduct." Marsh v.

County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2012).
Additionally, Greenfield contends that the district court denied her Fourteenth
Amendment right to Due Process. Perhaps this is the constitutional right Greenfield feels was
violated, providing her a § 1983 claim. However, again, any such claim would be against the
appropriate governmental entity rather than asserted against the Wurmlingers on appeal.
Greenfield does not explain how her constitutional rights have been violated other than
that she disagrees with the result of her trial. She doesn't support her claims with appropriate
citations to the appellate record. She has failed to designate specific assignments of error by the
district court. Nor does she explain what the Supreme Court can or should do about these alleged
violations on appeal. Greenfield's allegations of Constitutional rights violations have no place in
this appeal.

G.

Appellant Has Failed to Preserve any Issue Regarding Recusal of Judge Haynes:
Issue 11.
Greenfield argues that Judge Haynes was biased against her and should have recused

himself.
"In the absence of a motion for disqualification, this Court will not review
that issue on appeal." Because recusal from a case is committed to the
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sound discretion of the judge, in the absence of a motion there is no
decision of the court that can be reviewed, nor was a factual record
developed regarding the issue.

Flying ''A" Ranch, Inc. v. Bd. ofCty. Comm'rsfor Fremont Cty., 2014 WL 2726713, Docket No.
40987-2013, pp. 10-11 (Idaho 6-17-2014) (internal citations omitted). It is the appellant's duty
"to not only clearly state its contentions to the trial judge, but to make such contentions, and the
rulings thereon, of record so they may be reviewed on appeal." Van Velson Corp. v. Westwood

Mall Assocs., 126 Idaho 401,406, 884 P.2d 414,419 (1994). "[E]ither the specific ground for the
objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context."

Slackv. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916,921, 104 P.3d 958,963 (2004).
Greenfield did not make a motion for disqualification. Greenfield first attempted to raise
judicial bias in her Post Verdict Motions. See "Amended and Supplemental Affidavit of
Christina J. Greenfield in Support of Motion to Reconsider [the Denial of Greenfield's JNOV and
Set Aside Motions]." See R.. , pp. 506-508. Putting aside the question of whether those bare
allegations would be sufficient to preserve the disqualification/bias issue for appeal, the district
court granted the Wurmlingers' Motion to Strike Greenfield's "Amended and Supplemental
Affidavit" in support of her Motion to Reconsider as untimely and without justification. R., p.

65 3. Greenfield does not appeal the district court's decision to strike those supplemental
pleadings.
As such, not only did Greenfield fail to make a motion to disqualify Judge Haynes, but
she never even raised a timely issue with the district court. Therefore, Greenfield failed to
preserve the disqualification/bias issue for appellate review, and the Court need not consider it.

RESPONDENTS' APPELLATE BRIEF

-42

Furthermore, a review of the transcript and record will reveal that the proceedings had the
benefit of an unbiased judge attempting to achieve justice within the applicable rules. One
obvious example occurred during attorney Riseborough's cross-examination of Greenfield,
wherein he was attempting to establish that Greenfield's representations regarding her prior
occupations were inaccurate and incomplete. Judge Haynes, sua sponte, interrupted this crossexamination and warned that in the district court's opinion, Riseborough was wasting time. Tr.,

Vol. IL p. 569-571. Further, numerous objections asserted by Ms. Greenfield were sustained by
the trial court, numerous objections by Mr. Riseborough were overruled (see log of Greenfield's

sustained objections and Riseborough 's overruled objections, attached hereto as Exhibit "A'')
and the trial court took the opportunity on occasion to assist Ms. Greenfield with the procedural
and evidentiary issues. E.g., Tr., Vol. L pp. 144-145; Tr., Vol. L p. 294, ll. 10-15; Tr., Vol. II, pp.

513-514; Tr., Vol. IL pp. 523-525.
H.

The District Court Did Not Commit a "Fraud Upon the Court": Issue 12.
Greenfield's argument that Judge Haynes committed a "fraud upon the court" is

incomprehensible. Ms. Greenfield cites a "confidential bench memorandum" in support of her
fraud claim. How Ms. Greenfield came into possession of such a confidential memorandum is
unclear, but her use of it is a sad example of Ms. Greenfield's colored judgment and her "ends
justify the means" approach.
In any event, this is not a proper argument as contemplated by l.R.C.P. 60(b). The
confidential memorandum does not reflect tampering with the administration of justice so as to
suggest a wrong against the institution set up to protect and safeguard the public. Catledge v.
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Transport Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 607, 691 P.2d 1217 (1984). Moreover, the Confidential
Memorandum is not part of the appellate record. Rather it is confidential and exempt from
disclosure pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(g)(21). See also Respondents' Motion to Strike. The judgment
of the district court should be affirmed.

I.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Awarding Costs and Attorney
Fees to the Wurmlingers: Issue 13.
The timber trespass statute provides for an award of fees to the prevailing party. LC. § 6-

202. The Wurmlingers received a money judgment on their timber trespass claim. R., p. 349.
Article III, Section 1 of the CC&Rs provides that if a lawsuit is brought to enforce the
covenants, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Plaintiffs Trial Ex. #1. Greenfield's CC&R claims were dismissed. R., p. 439.
The Wurmlingers moved for costs and attorney fees, submitting supporting affidavits
from each of their attorneys detailing the amount of time spent and fees charged for
representation related to the timber trespass and CC&R issues. See R., pp. 665-667.
Determination of an award of costs, attorney's fees, and the prevailing party are matters
within the discretion of the trial court. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 434-435, 111 P.3d
110 (2005). In granting the Wurmlingers' motion, the district court recognized its discretion,
acted within the bounds of that discretion, and reached its conclusion through the exercise of
reason. R., pp. 668-673. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
costs and attorney fees to the Wurmlingers.
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Wurmlingers request attorney fees on appeal. An award of attorney fees on appeal
may be granted under LC. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 to the prevailing party. Excel Leasing Co. v.

Christensen, 115 Idaho 708, 712, 769 P.2d 585 (App. 1989). Such an award is appropriate when
the Supreme Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Id. An appeal may be deemed frivolous, and
attorney fees awarded, for failure to properly comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(6), requiring cogent legal
argument with respect to the issues presented on appeal, with citations to the authorities and
appellate record. Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 61, 244 P.3d 197 (2010). In particular, an
award will be made if an appeal does no more than simply invites the appellate court to secondguess a trial court on conflicting evidence, or - on review of discretionary decisions - no cogent
challenge is presented with regard to the trial judge's exercise of discretion. Pass v. Kenny, 118
Idaho 445,449, 797 P.2d 153 (App. 1990).
Appellant's presentation on appeal is similar to that presented in Kirkman v. Stoker, 134
Idaho 541, 546, 6 P.3d 397 (2000). She argues numerous issues she failed to preserve for appeal
by proper objection. Id. She argues with findings of fact and discretionary decisions and invites
this Court to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Id. Therefore, the
Wurmlingers should be awarded reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
Even if the Court finds that Greenfield has not pursued this appeal frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation, to the extent they prevail, the Wurmlingers request
reasonable attorney fees for work associated with the timber trespass and CC&R claims.
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The timber trespass statute, I.C. § 6-202 specifically includes "a reasonable attorney's fee
which shall be taxed as costs, in any civil action brought to enforce the terms of this act if the
plaintiff prevails." Similarly, Article III, Section 1 of the CC&Rs provides that, "In any suit or
action brought to reinforce these covenants, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover costs
and reasonable attorney fees from the other party." Plaintiff's Trial Ex. #1.
Therefore, the Wurmlingers should be awarded reasonable attorney fees on appeal
pursuant to I.A.R. 41 and LC. § 12-121 because this appeal was pursued frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation. Alternatively, to the extent they prevail, the Wurmlingers
should be awarded reasonable attorney fees on appeal for work associated with the timber
trespass and CC&R claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Wurmlingers respectfully request that the judgment of
the district court be affirmed in its entirety.
DATED this _ _ day of August, 2014.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
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